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BOOK REVIEWS

Experience, Explanation and Faith: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Religion, by Anthony O'Hear. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984,
pp. 266, xiii. Paper, $10.95.
THOMAS V. MORRIS, The University of Notre Dame.
In an act of creative inference, Anthony O'Hear concludes from his study of
religion that typical religious beliefs, such as belief in the existence of a God,
"are not rationally acceptable." This is announced in his introduction to the book,
along with a recommendation that "rational men should look beyond religion
for the fulfillment of their spiritual needs." The hero of this book is the Buddha
who, according to O'Hear, did just that. In the author's own words, which
comprise the last sentence of the book:
The beauty of the Buddha's spirituality is precisely that it is a spirituality
without faith, without words, without explanation, and without religion.
(251)

This is not, however, a book on Buddhism, an exercise in comparative religion,
or an essay on religion and spirituality. It is rather a fairly standard sort of treatise
in the philosophy of religion, written in what has come to be known as the
broadly analytic style. It is presented, by its subtitle, as an introduction to this
field of philosophy. As such, it has some merits. It is fairly clearly written, it
attempts an extended argument, linking its various chapters in service to a
dominant organizing theme, and it touches on some important topics often neglected in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of religion. I suspect however that although many philosophers concerned with religious problems will
find some of O'Hear's arguments interesting to read, few will find the book
suitable for classroom use. For its weaknesses as an introductory text are significant.
The level of exposition is in some ways quite variable. Many sections of the
book could be read with interest and understanding by any fairly intelligent and
generally educated person. But the philosophical neophyte will hardly be able
to retain his equilibrium through, for example, numerous mentions of S5 and
Brouwershe systems sprinkled throughout O'Hear's convoluted discussion of the
ontological argument. Further, although the general aim of the book is fairly
clear, and most paragraphs in its exposition are lucid enough in their own right,
the various stages in the overall argument are not sufficiently well marked to
keep most introductory students from losing their way. This is especially problematic in a 112 page chapter entitled "Religious Explanations," which seems
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to make up the core of the book.
In addition, O'Hear seems to have invested a good deal more energy into his
anti-religious rhetoric than into constructi!1g careful arguments to support his
claims. His tone is often strident, his characterizations of religion and religious
belief tendentious, and his strategy of argument surprising-such that his conclusions are severely underdetermined by the argumentative tactics he employs.
In chapter one, "Faith and Religious Life," o 'Hear sketches out some important
ways in which religions function in the lives of their adherents, a topic to which
he returns in the last chapter. Faith is presented as "an all-encompassing set of
attitudes to human life and the world." And religions are depicted as typically
providing a framework of beliefs which both explain important features of their
world to believers, and endow their individual lives with meaning. Although the
discussion here is brief, and is marred by a depreciating tone at times, it is good
to see a philosopher giving at least some attention to these elements of religion
most often discussed only by sociologists (such as, for example, Peter Berger)
and professors of Religious Studies.
Lest he be thought to be endorsing a Wittgensteinian view of religion as a
"form of life" in which the activities and attitudes of believers are more central
than their beliefs, and the functions of those beliefs more important than their
truth-value, O'Hear devotes the bulk of this first chapter to a discussion and
critique of Wittgenstein's characterizations of religion. The exposition of
Wittgenstein is responsible, and the criticisms well taken, though somewhat
standard. It is stressed that religions do make truth claims which can be understood
as well as investigated by the uncommitted.
After having established in chapter one the importance of particular beliefs,
such as the belief that there is a God, in typical religions, O'Hear goes on in
his second chapter to begin the cummulative argument which he thinks will show
that standard theistic beliefs cannot withstand rational criticism (for this conclusion, see 249). In chapter two, entitled "Religious Experience and Religious
Knowledge," he essays to explore the common claim that central religious beliefs,
such as belief in God, are justified rationally by their connection to certain sorts
of experience which give rise to them. The focus of his examination is the often
drawn parallel between religious experience and sense experience. As we all are
justified in taking our sense experience to be for the most part a reliable mode,
or set of modes, of information-access to an objective reality existing distinct
from such experience, so, the argument goes, religious believers are justified in
taking their theistic experiences to yield reliable access to an objective theistic
reality--God. o 'Hear understands the parallel here to be one between explanatory
schemes: As the hypothesis of reliability and the postulation of an objective
physical reality is supposed to have explanatory power with respect to the shape
of ordinary sense experience, so the hypothesis of reliability and postulation of
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a God causally responsible for it is supposed to have explanatory power with
respect to the shape ofreligious experience. His argument then is that the theistic
explanatory scheme, unlike the external world scheme, does not satisfy numerous
criteria for a good scientific explanatory theory, criteria such as generation of
reliable predictions.
It would be hard for any theist to resist the penetrating rejoinder of "If so, so
what?" Why should religious beliefs satisfy criteria appropriate to hypotheses
purporting to give a certain sort of explanation of the natural in terms of the
natural? O'Hear's approach here is reminiscent of the attitude of Richard Taylor
toward dualism in his little book Metaphysics, where he seems to suggest that
I am justified in thinking I have a mind only if the postulation of such an entity
in my case would have significant explanatory value for me, and explanatory
value of the sort professionally sought after by chemists, physicists, and molecular
biologists. I, for one, see no good reason to adopt this attitude. Typical metaphysical beliefs just seem very different from typical hypotheses in the natural sciences.
And even within the domain of metaphysics, there is a great deal of difference.
For example, theists believe in a causally active individual with whom they may
come in contact; no essentialist expects ever to be accosted by an haecceity.
Thus the epistemic dynamics of theism and essentialism will be interestingly
different from one another, and surely also essentially different from the dynamics
of scientific hypotheses.
Aside from such problems concerning the structure of O'Hear's argument, the
main shortcoming of this second chapter is his failure to even consider any of
the exciting recent work relevant to the connection between religious experience
and religious belief being done by such philosophers as William Alston, Alvin
Plantinga, Robert Oakes, Gary Gutting, and Nicholas Wolterstroff, among many
others. It is safe to say that some of the main implications of this work in religious
epistemology bear importantly on our assessment of the status of religious experience. And so a chapter on the topic ignores all of this work to its great detriment.
In the third chapter, "Religion, Truth, and Morality," O'Hear considers the
possibility that there is something about the human cognitive endeavor, or the
moral enterprise, which requires a postulation or acknowledgement of theism as
true. To examine the claim that in our search always to know and understand
we are making assumptions which make sense only, or best, within a theistic
framework, O'Hear canvasses some of the writings of Rahner, Lonergan, and
Kolakowski. He overlooks important contemporary arguments to this effect by
Keith Ward, Hugo Meynell, and George Schlesinger, which are all of significant
interest. It should be no surprise that o 'Hear finds the few arguments he considers
uncompelling. In the section on morality, the author presents a fairly standard,
brief, and unoriginal discussion of the Euthyphro Dilemma. This involves a very
superficial consideration of divine command theories of ethics. The chapter
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suffers severely by being uninformed by the important relevant work of Quinn,
Wierenga, Mavrodes, Adams, and others. It is not that I expect every introductory
text to include a survey of recent literature. The point here and above is rather
that even this level text will be lacking in value if its discussions do not take
into consideration the best of what has been said on its topics. To conclude the
chapter, O'Hear attempts to sketch out a naturalistic foundation for morality,
basing it on facts about human psychology and the nature of shared projects.
His conclusion is that neither knowledge nor morality points to God.
Chapter four, "Religious Explanations," practically a treatise in itself, examines
some of the best known arguments for the existence of God comprising traditional
and contemporary natural theology. As if to stress the importance of demonstrative
or probabilifying arguments to the rationality of theism, O'Hear begins the
chapter by reviewing and rejecting the suggestion made by F. R. Tennant and
others that it is acceptable for religion to rest on faith, since science just as much
relies on fundamental faith in such assumptions as that, for instance, nature is
uniform and induction is reliable. O'Hear attempts to impugn the analogy by
insisting that science does not require anything like religious faith in uniformity
and inductive procedures, a highly tentative and provisional"hope" in these things
rather sufficing for successful scientific work. But of course this is a bit weak
and hardly to the point. As a matter of fact, the expectations of the average
working scientist that uniformity will hold and the induction will work are as
strong as any of his other beliefs. And surely he is rational in this, regardless
of whether that strength of conviction is strictly required by his science. The
rationality of the ordinary convinced scientist does not, of course, render the
provisional attitude of the sophisticate O'Hear apparently has in mind irrational.
But neither does the presumed rationality of the tentative sophisticate reflect
negatively on the average laboratory believer. And this is all a Tennant-style
argument really needs.
O'Hear then goes on to consider cosmological, teleological, and ontological
arguments for the existence of God. One interesting feature of the discussion is
that he begins by propounding a quite minimal thesis that rejection of these
arguments by a person not already inclined to believe in God is not irrational
and not without justification, maintains a correspondingly moderate tone
throughout the actual examinations of the arguments, and yet later in his concluding chapter, with no relevant intervening argument to bridge this gap, unveils
his overall conclusion that theism cannot withstand rational scrutiny.
In discussing the cosmological and teleological arguments, O'Hear addresses
some quite interesting topics, but does not dig deeply enough to provide the sort
of fresh insights which are needed at this stage in the discussion of theistic
argumentation. One such topic is the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The author
does not trouble to inquire into how a consistent theist will understand the
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principle, and as a result does not give it the precise sort of formulation it needs.
Nor is he very careful in assessing the modal status of the principle. He infers
from the fact that it is not inconceivable that within this world there be brute
facts to the conclusion that PSR is not a necessary truth. But first of all, as is
nowadays quite well known, we must be careful not to confIate psychological
questions of conceivability or imaginability with questions of broadly logical
necessity and possibility. Further, I think it can be argued that although it is
possible to have doubts about the truth-value of PSR (it can seem possible that
it be true, possible that it be false), its modal status is such that it is necessarily
true or necessarily false. For according to the version of PSR a traditional theist
will hold, every contingent physical or natural event, fact, or state of affairs
which occurs or obtains will be such that there is a reason why it occurs or
obtains, a reason which involves either its direct dependence on God as its cause,
or its dependence on some other free-willed agent as its cause, which in tum
depends on God as a cause of its existence. The only sort of God on whom all
explanations can thus ultimately depend, whose existence can be argumentatively
displayed through a use ofPSR, will be a God with necessary existence, necessary
omnipotence, and necessary omniscience. But then it is impossible that there
exist anything independent of the will and causal activity of such a being. And
only if something could exist independently of his will, the ultimate ground of
the truth of PSR, could PSR be false. Thus, if there is a God, he necessarily
exists and PSR is of necessity true. Although I shall not take the space to sketch
it here, I think that it also can be argued that only if there is such a God is PSR
true. If there is no such God, there necessarily is none, and so PSR is necessarily
false. Either way, its modal status is one of necessity.
Another idea O'Hear touches on but does not explore the way it needs exploring
is one often relied upon by Swinburne-the idea of prior probabilities for theism
and naturalism, and the notion that considerations of theoretical or ontological
simplicity are somehow relevant to the assignment of such probabilities. There
is a great deal of mystery and some controversy surrounding these ideas nowadays.
O'Hear rejects Swinburne's positions, but without, unfortunately, giving much
by way of argument for doing so. He chooses rather to rebuff Swinburne's claim
that its simplicity endows theism with significant prior probability with little
more than the remark that "Not all philosophers of science regard such simplicity
as increasing prior probability" (115). But of course, as that notable Renaissance
thinker Henrikus Cornelius Agrippa von Nettlesheim was wont to observe, "Philosophers disagree about everything." It is neither very illuminating, nor a very
great blow to Swinburne, to point out that some philosophers of science disagree
with him. The complex issue of the bearing of simplicity on probability, or for
that matter the bearing of probability at all, in such contexts still cries out for
elucidation if real progress is to be made in our evaluations of Swinburne-style
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arguments.
In his assessment of one form of teleological argument, O'Hear resists what
he considers the crucial assumption of the all-pervasive uniformity of order in
the universe throughout all space and time by attempting to replace it with the
ancient Epicurean hypothesis of the locality of order (not in my mind a real
alternative at all). He ends by saying "All we have here are competing intuitions
and no means of deciding between them," a modest claim indeed. However, the
modesty is short-lived as O'Hear turns his attention to the ontological argument.
He begins his commentary on this fascinating argument, or family of arguments, by announcing that the very idea of an ontological argument "involves
a negation of all thought and all intellectual discrimination" (143). According
to O'Hear, the ideal of God's being necessary "has a Zen-like effect of mesmerizing those who submit themselves to it," a remark which surely rivals some
of the purple prose of which the late John Mackie was capable when being
goaded by St. Anselm's discovery. After such an introduction, it is quite disappointing to find O'Hear's actual discussion of the details of the argument somewhat convoluted and for the most part unoriginal. And, again, the discussion is
adversely affected by failure to sort out issues of alethic modality from those of
conceivability.
One of the strangest features in the book comes to the surface predominently
in this chapter. O'Hear seems to think that the only proper conclusion to an
ontological or cosmological argument will involve the postulation of a being
without determinate attributes, a God of "pure being." The connection of such
a conception with these arguments, however, is nearly as big a mystery as the
conception itself. While applauding O'Hear's rejection of severely aprophatic
theology, I must wonder why in the world he thinks it is even relevant here. He
appears to claim, moreover repeatedly, that what anyone who is attracted to the
ontological argument is trying to express is the conviction that God's existence
is very different from the existence of anything else, and that since the existence
of everything else is the existence of a determinate reality characterized by
numerous distinct attributes, the conviction being expressed is that God is an
indeterminate ground of all determinate reality, himself without discrete properties and thus literally indescribable by any standard linguistic means. O'Hear
rightly brands such a view as incoherent. But the inference by which he attributes
it to proponents of ontological arguments could not be more patently fallacious.
From the conviction that God's existence is in some important ways very different
from that of any other reality (e.g. by being absolutely independent ontologically
and unconditioned by any deeper ground of existence) it does not follow that it
is different in every respect from the existence of other realities, which would
of course be impossible.
Likewise, O'Hear seems to think that the cosmological argument requires that
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God be an indetenninate, property-less ground of all existence if he is to be a
proper stopping-point of explanation, given the relentless press of PSR. The
assumption operative here seems to be that any property instantiation requires
explanation, and the consequent argument to be that if God had detenninate
properties, they would require explanation, which could not itself in every case
be provided by God. The theist, however, has a number of ways available to
him for avoiding the obviously unacceptable conclusion O'Hear attributes to
him. The best known involves a claim that only contingently, not necessarily,
exemplified properties are such that their exemplification requires explanation.
Those of God's properties which comprise his nature and so might be thought
to be beyond explanation by his activity, such as his omnipotence, omniscience,
and so forth, are not such that their exemplification requires further explanation,
according to a properly fonnulated PSR; and those which do not comprise his
nature can be explained by his causal activity. O'Hear does not consider any
such possibilities, remaining content to ascribe to proponents of these theistic
arguments a clearly absurd view instead.
Chapter five, "Suffering and Evil," is perhaps the most interesting, and certainly
the most surprising in the book. After considering both the logical and evidential
fonns of the problem of evil and reviewing some standard theistic responses,
O'Hear concludes from his own assessment of the challenge that "the argument
against religion from evil and suffering fails" (221). Basically, O'Hear contends
that the reality of suffering seems so intimately tied up with the development of
a virtuous as well as a rational fonn of life in the world that it would be extremely
hard for any critic of theism to establish with any rational force the claim that
a world created by a God could not contain (or most likely would not contain)
the sorts and amounts of suffering blighting our world.
It may sound as if O'Hear just endores the well known Virtuous Response,
or Soul-Making Theodicy here. But his reasoning is actually interestingly different
from such views as standardly propounded by theists. The typical theist's claim
is that it is morally justifiable for God to have created an environment in which
beings capable of moral freedom can in response to hardship freely attain morally
virtuous characters and spiritual qualities which are necessary conditions for
partaking in the beatific communion with God which is eternal life, and is the
goal for which they are created. O'Hear argues that the conception of heaven
standardly offered as a description of the end-state in which soul-making properly
culminates actually involves assumptions logically inconsistent with the genuine
insights about the intimate connection between suffering and difficulty on the
one hand and rational virtuous life on the other. The heavenly state of existence
is usually characterized as one utterly devoid of sufferings, frustrations, or difficulties of any kind. O'Hear contends that the link between these negativities
and the positive features of human life are such that no recognizably human,
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rational existence would be possible in their absence. This is not an altogether
new contention, having been suggested in one way or another by other philosophers in recent years, but it is still novel and interesting enough when properly
developed to merit further work. The challenge is for theists to display a conception of the ultimate human state of communion with God which is consonant
with claims made in the context of the problem of evil. If God's justification in
bringing about or allowing certain evils is that they are logically necessary
conditions for certain important goods, and heaven lacks those evils, does it not
just follow that heaven is devoid of those important goods? This is O'Hear's
challenge. Most recent work on the after-life has centered around questions of
the possibility of resurrection or disembodied existence. I think that at this
juncture theists could move on to consider other problems concerning the afterlife, such as those raised by O'Hear, and by such other philosophers as, say,
Bernard Williams. We would all benefit from the attempt to delineate models
for after-life and to show in some detail what is wrong with the sort of objection
exemplified by O'Hear's reasoning.
In the sixth and final chapter of this book, "Religion and the Rational Man,"
there is an intimation of what may be the main reason O'Hear finds theistic
belief rationally unacceptable. It is not so much that he finds theism lacking in
the virtues of a good scientific hypothesis, or that he appraises standard theistic
arguments as less than compelling, or even that he judges the overall traditional
theistic vision of human life as aiming at a bliss full eternity to be problematic,
but rather it seems that his negative assessment may turn crucially on what he
considers to be the apparent inexplicability of the hidden-ness of God. If there
is a God, O'Hear joins many others in asking, why does he not show himself
more clearly? Why is this world of ours at best religiously ambiguous to the
inquiring observer? Hick's well known response O'Hear finds completely unsatisfactory, and by pressing the point draws our attention to one of the most remarkable problems for religious belief-remarkable in that the degree to which it is
treated in contemporary literature in the philosophy of religion seems to stand
in an inverse relation to its commonality and importance as a religious problem.
What I am referring to as the hidden-ness of God may be a problem for as
many people, believers as well as searching unbelievers, as is the enormity of
pain and suffering. In fact, the problem of evil can even be seen as indicating
a way in which if there is a God, he is hidden. So what may be the most widely
discussed problem in the philosophy of religion may be a version of what in its
most general features may be one of the most neglected topics among philosophers
working in the field since the writings of Pascal. The value of O'Hear's remarks,
which are somewhat sketchy and truncated, lies primarily in the reminder they
carry that this is a problem which requires much more direct philosophical
attention than it has received.
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After a lengthy exposition concerning what he considers the dogmatism and
lack of critical attitude in traditional religion, O'Hear wraps up his discussion
by saying "My thesis in this chapter has been that religion is essentially dogmatic,
fetishistic, and authoritarian; that this aspect of religion is what religion derives
its strength from" (249), by, as he has suggested, pandering to the emotional
and psychological needs of people. And, not to miss a way of dismissing religion,
he adds to his characterization of it as rationally indefensible the claim that in
addition "religion (at least in any traditional form) cannot be a force for good
at the present" (244), a claim which has in this book just as little argumentative
support.

Mysticism and Religious Traditions, ed. by Steven T. Katz. Oxford University
Press, 1983.
Reviewed by NELSON PIKE, University of California, Irvine.
Professor Katz begins the "Editor's Introduction" to this text with a sketch of
what he calls "the predominant scholarly view" concerning the relation between
the mystic of a given culture and "the socio-historical, Philosophical-theological"
environment provided by the culture in question. According to this view, the
mystic is one who has something called "the mystical experience" and who then
"soars above dogma and community, leaving the sober majority behind to its
mechanical, if irrelevant, religious teachings and practices". The mystic's contact
with the religious community of which he is a part comes only at the point where
he " ... must descend from his height and then, caught up again in the fetters of
tradition and history, space and time, he must express what is truly inexpressible
in the inadequate symbols and syntax of his particular faith community". Given
this "common image" (what Katz calls "the "regnant scholarly orthodoxy"), the
question arises as to whether it may not be in error. And (Katz tell us) it is this
possibility-the possibility that it may be fundamentally mistaken-that (in his
words) "has brought the present symposium into being". Speaking ofthe relation
between the mystic and cultural milieu in which the mystic exists, Katz identifies
the issue to which the ten essays contained in this volume are (presumably)
addressed as follows:
The essays in this volume have been written in order to reconsider
this relational issue afresh with the hope that a more adequate schematization of this dialectical encounter can be arrived at. This is to say, the
present essays are attempts to reconsider, in various ways, the question:
"What relation(s) does obtain between mystics and the religious com-

